On abductive inference and delusional belief: why there is still a role for patient experience within explanations of Capgras delusion.
This paper aims to examine critically the explanatory model of delusional belief presented in Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton's (2010) paper, "Abductive Inference and Delusional Belief". The authors acknowledge that certain aspects of the model are speculative. In return, I speculate over the likelihood that the model's emphasis on subpersonal processing adequately and coherently explains the symptoms (as best we know them) of patients with delusional misidentification (specifically, the Capgras delusion) and nondeluded equivalent patient groups. In addition, I offer an account of the Capgras delusion that is compatible with many of the tenets of Coltheart et al.'s model, but which preserves an important explanatory role for patient experience absent, and erroneously so, I contend, from the aforementioned model. The more integrated explanation I am proposing here also provides a number of pertinent empirical questions and testable hypotheses that could inform future models of delusional belief.